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Insofar as China was a potential menace, it could not be a menace for some years to come. The cold war with the Soviet Union had ceased to be urgently menacing.

The United States had a President who, as it happened, was much better fitted to conduct a quiet foreign policy than an active one. At the same time, the evil consequences of our neglected domestic problems were pressing upon us, and the country needed a President who knew how to use the American political system to deal with the urgent domestic problems.

L.B.J.'S 180-DEGREE TURN

On these two themes, to be quiet and uninvolved abroad and to repair, reform and reconstruct at home, Lyndon Johnson conducted his triumphant election campaign of 1964. He told the people, and they believed him, that he would not involve them in a war in Asia; he said he would heed and grasp and deal with our problems at home.

I shall not attempt to spell out for you what has actually happened as a result of the 180-degree turn away from the 1964 election.

But I cannot pretend to think that such a radical and violent change of course will not affect the country greatly. I do not lose faith. I do not doubt that in the long run we shall find a way through the consequences of the crucial decisions which changed the course which was set by the people in the election of 1964.

You who are remaining close to the sources of power and the center of decision will have much to do before the ship of state has righted itself and is again sailing on its true course.

As for myself, I shall be doing my little bit, having given myself the advantage of some distance from the daily details.

Mr. LAUSCHE. Mr. President, earlier in the day there was a colloquy concerning the issue of whether the United States is the aggressor in South Vietnam. I took the position that it was not. After my statements were made, there were placed in the Record certain documents and declarations which were in conflict with what I said; and I should now like to make a recitation of my analysis of the situation in South Vietnam.

The Geneva accord of 1954 is one of the important documents involved in the discussion of the day. It was violated by the Communist North Vietnamese from the very day that it was signed by them. The Communists left military forces and supplies in South Vietnam, in violation of their agreement. Certainly some of the Communist guerrillas moved from the south to the north, supposedly in compliance with the Geneva accord, but in truth for further training in guerrilla warfare and Communist subversion, infiltration, terrorism, and other techniques; and then, after they were fully trained, they were sent back into South Vietnam in violation of the Geneva accord.

The Communist aggression in South Vietnam became especially intensified during 1961, with increased infiltration and a marked stepping up of the Communist terrorism in the south. The Communists of the north violated the Geneva accord, not the United States. It would have been folly for the South Vietnamese, after the repeated and many violations of the accord by the Communists, to abide by the agreement. It is a common understanding in law that when one party violates an agreement, no expectations

should be held out that the adverse party will conform to it.

The argument is made that the Geneva accord of July 21, 1954, contained a provision for a general election to be held in July 1956, in order to obtain a free expression of national will. The 1954 accord also stated that consultations would be held on the subject of free elections between the competent representative authorities of the two zones from July 20, 1955, onward.

Mr. President, open, free, and honest elections on the basis of the conduct of the Communist north were simply impossible of achievement in July, 1956. The conditions in North Vietnam during that period were such as to make impossible any free and meaningful expression of popular will. In the north and in the south, the Communist system of terrorizing the people into compliance with the dictation of the Communist leaders was rampant. Communist leaders were running a police state, where executions, terror, and torture were commonplace. No one in the north would have dared to vote except as directed. An election under those circumstances manifestly would have meant turning the country over to the Communists.

Under the Geneva Accord, there was created an International Control Commission, consisting of representatives of Poland, India, and Canada. In 1962, the legal committee of the International Control Commission made a report. I ask those Senators now present in the Chamber to listen carefully to the report:

There is evidence to show that arms, armed and unarmed personnel, munitions and other supplies have been sent from the Zone in the North to the Zone in the South, with the objective of supporting, organizing and carrying out hostile activities, including armed attacks, directed against the Armed Forces and Administration of the Zone in the South.

The legal decision of the International Control Commission further stated:

There is evidence that the PAVN (People's Army of Vietnam) has allowed the Zone in the North to be used for inciting, encouraging and supporting hostile activities in the Zone in the South, aimed at the overthrow of the Administration in the South.

It is shocking and painful to understand that, in the face of this finding by the International Control Commission consisting of representatives of India, Canada, and Poland, arguments are still made that the Communists of Hanoi were not involved at all in the terrorist taking of lives in the south and the subversion and infiltration that occurred. It is absolutely false to charge that the disorders and violence in South Vietnam were a spontaneous uprising of the people against oppression and exploitation of their rights. It is the same argument that was made in respect to China. In that instance the argument was made that it was a peasants' revolution and that Communists had nothing to do with it. Subsequent events proved the falsehood of the claim that it was a peasants' revolution, and subsequent events established clearly that everything that was done was engineered, designed, and motivated by the Communists.

Why are we involved in this difficulty in South Vietnam?

It is because the Nation's word has been given that we would not tolerate the Communists taking over by aggression the governments of people who did not want Communist control.

We are involved in South Vietnam because Presidents Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson—selected by the people of our country because of the confidence which they had in them—had declared that the United States cannot and should not suffer the expansion of communism in southeast Asia against the will of the people of those nations; the United States wanted to insure its own security.

Mr. President, the argument was made today about the great force and weight of a Professor Kahin. Professor Kahin went to southeast Asia. He then came back and made a report. Who is Kahin? I wonder if any Senator is able to identify Kahin. Yet Kahin's word is to be taken in preference to the word of Presidents Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson.

Mr. HATFIELD. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. LAUSCHE. I yield.

Mr. HATFIELD. The Senator is referring to Prof. George McTurnan Kahin, who holds a distinguished chair at Cornell University. He is Professor of Government and Director of the Cornell Southeast Asian Program.

Professor Kahin has written a number of books and articles on southeast Asia, and I think he is recognized as a great authority on that area of the world.

Mr. LAUSCHE. Am I to take his word over the word of Presidents Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson? I simply cannot do so. It is just out of the question.

We have, in addition to the word of Presidents Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson, the word of Acheson, Dulles, Herter, and Rusk, and of every Secretary of Defense, every chief of the Central Intelligence Agency, and of every member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the U.S. Department of Defense.

I simply cannot take this man's word in preference to the word of all of the other officials.

Mr. President, in 1965 when the Tonkin Bay joint resolution was promoted on the floor of the Senate by the Senator from Arkansas [Mr. Fulbright] and agreed to, the distinguished Senator from Kentucky [Mr. Cooper] made an argument in which he pointed out in substance what I have just stated. The Senator from Kentucky set forth in his argument on March 25, 1965, the statements made by the Canadian delegation, outlining the position of the United States with respect to South Vietnam. It may be that the Senator from Kentucky would like to confirm what I have just said.

Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, I have recently read a book on Vietnam by Professor Kahin of Cornell University. It is a rather interesting book.

To return to the matter to which the Senator has referred and to put it in context, on March 25, 1965, nearly 2